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NSC 78/2

COPY NO. 39

A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
AND
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

on

PORT SECURITY

NSC, NAVY & Treasury Declassification/Release Instructions on File

September 4, 1951

WASHINGTON

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September 4, 1951

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

PORT SECURITY

- References: A. NSC Action No. 428
B. NSC 78/1
C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 31 and February 1, 1951

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the enclosed report by the Under Secretary of the Treasury and the Acting Secretary of the Navy, which presents a revision and refinement of NSC 78/1 on the subject, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and will be scheduled on the agenda of an early Council meeting.

The Attorney General and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, are being invited to participate in Council consideration of the enclosure.

It is recommended that, if the Council concurs in the proposed additional defensive measures contained in paragraph 7-b, they be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve them and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.

S. EVERETT GLEASON
Acting Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director of Defense Mobilization
The Director, Bureau of the Budget

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REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON

PORT SECURITY

THE PROBLEM

1. To provide, under emergent conditions short of actual war and at a nominal expenditure of funds, the maximum practicable security against accident or sabotage to U.S. port facilities and vessels therein and against the illegal entry from sea of personnel and materiel inimical to the national interest; and to insure that steps taken make suitable provision for security measures under the conditions which would exist in the early part of a sudden war.

DISCUSSION

Note: For the purpose of this paper the words "Soviet" or "enemy" are to be taken as indicating the U.S.S.R. and/or its Satellites.

2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. War beginning days, months, or years from the date of this report is considered possible. The Soviets have a known strategic objective of world domination. Although willing to attempt this objective by global war if necessary they have a flexible time table and will avoid war if they can attain domination by other means. The date on which the Soviets may decide to initiate a war is expected to depend primarily on their estimate of the relative trend of U.S. physical, economic, political, or moral strength.

b. Defensive measures must anticipate the possibility of war being initiated by the Soviets without advance warning or indication that an attack is imminent. The Soviets have the strategic initiative in determining whether to initiate war and if initiated, to set the time and type of initial operations. Soviet initiation of a war by surprise mass bombing attack without other normal attack deployments is a possible operation and in view of the advantages of such an attack should be a major consideration in the development of U. S. defensive measures.

c. Economic disaster to the U.S. through the maintenance over a period of time of larger military expenditures than the U.S. economy can stand may contribute just as much to Soviet long-range strategic objectives as an actual military victory for the Soviets. U.S. resources are not unlimited and fall short of the preponderance of strength desirable in efforts to prevent war and in prosecuting a war if one occurs. The best war preventive is a strong offensive force in being. Allocation of excessive national resources for strictly defensive purposes will contribute to the Soviet objective either by reducing the offensive forces needed to prevent or win a war or by placing a breaking strain on the U.S. economy. The enemy ^{might} can be expected to take advantage of this situation. Until they are ready to

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attack they can be expected to initiate any and all damaging measures which are short of their estimate of the actions it would take for the U. S. to declare war. Threats, pressures, tensions, and sporadic sabotage for the specific purpose of causing clamor by the U.S. public for expensive protective measures can be expected, and must be properly evaluated, as part of the Soviet planned course of action.

d. Acceptance of appropriate calculated risks is essential if the U.S. is to maintain over any appreciable time the necessary economic and military strength to resist Soviet aggression. The practical and political impossibility of the U. S. maintaining a strong economy while military forces are at full strength in times of relative peace requires no comment here.

e. Appreciation and evaluation of the problem facing the U.S. and the recommending of appropriate calculated risks to higher authority is one of the most serious and important responsibilities to the national interest of any defense agency. This current staff study is based on the above concept. For example there is little doubt but that the greatest need for port security forces will occur in the period starting immediately after or just prior to the start of a war. Present Coast Guard estimates for wartime requirements for adequate Port Security and Beach Patrol forces total

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71,000 officers and men. If this number is required for the period of greatest need and no calculated risks are to be taken there would be no alternative for the Coast Guard but to recommend the immediate adoption of a program calling for the recruitment of this number of officers and men. Annual personnel costs alone for this number on active duty would total about 276 million dollars. This number trained in the Reserve would cost about 20 million dollars annually, and even this would be some degree of calculated risk due to the time lag in getting them called to active duty. The necessity for obtaining maximum practicable security without the expenditure of such large funds and without withdrawing this number of men from more productive work is appreciated and acknowledged.

3. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

a. A basic assumption is that the enemy realizes the most crippling blow she could inflict on the capability of the U. S. to wage war would be a completely surprise mass bombing attack on strategic U.S. centers with atomic bombs and other unconventional weapons and at the same time to initiate other actions to create as much damage as possible before defensive forces could become effective.

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b. A second basic assumption is that the enemy realizes U.S. authorities appreciate the fact that any direct attack against the U.S. with conventional or unconventional weapons and any direct act of serious sabotage by the U.S.S.R. against the U.S. will be inextricably geared to enemy over-all war plans and will indicate with almost certainty that the U.S.S.R. had definitely committed itself to all-out war against the U.S.

4. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST U. S. PORTS AND VESSELS

a. A Soviet analysis of the methods of obtaining optimum results in mass destruction, in reducing the U.S. war potential and the will to fight of the American people will disclose a number of actions which would contribute to this objective. No single act of destruction, subsidiary to a surprise mass bombing attack will, however, produce anywhere near the results which would be obtained from complete surprise in an initial bombing attack before the U.S. was alerted to Soviet intentions of definitely committing themselves to war on the U.S. It is assumed therefore that the U.S.S.R. will probably consider all subsidiary actions of destruction with relation to the possibility of their being detected before the actual presense and intentions of an

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attacking bombing force are known to U.S. military authorities. To obtain optimum results, and avoid premature disclosure of intent, exact timing of subsidiary actions is essential and for most of the desirable courses of action may present insurmountable problems and unacceptable risks of disclosure of war intentions if the U.S. takes reasonable protective measures. A critical examination of the problems of carrying out and timing of each subsidiary action which may appear to have possibilities in contributing to the objective of mass destruction and confusion is therefore necessary. Some of the major subsidiary action, of concern to the Coast Guard, which would give optimum results if timed with the initiating of a mass bombing attack, are as follows:

(1) Initiation of atomic explosion in each harbor of the U.S. Atomic bombs introduced into the harbor by:

(a) Soviet controlled vessel which had loaded at a Soviet controlled port with an atomic bomb hidden in the cargo or attached to the underwater hull of the vessel. Such a bomb might be set off while attached to the hull or still in the hold or dropped in the harbor with a timing device attached. This situation assumes vessel enters in the normal manner and satisfies usual entrance requirements.

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Comment: This is a feasible and acceptable operation if a Soviet controlled vessel is permitted in a harbor area prior to thorough inspection. The initiating action to place the bomb aboard ship and for the ship to depart for the U.S. port of attack would have to be taken at least 10 days before the hour of the scheduled attack. In the case of a Soviet controlled vessel the final attack commitment would obviously not occur upon the departure of the vessel as almost up to the time of taking her pilot in a U.S. port the master could probably reverse course and return to a Soviet port without detection. The ability to set off an explosion in a harbor at an exact and predetermined time would, under present conditions, be probably impossible due to the unpredictable time lag between time of arrival off the harbor entrance and the time the vessel might be permitted to move into the harbor proper.

(b) Merchant vessel, other than Soviet controlled, loading in a Soviet port and entering in the normal manner.

Comment: This operation may have possibilities depending on (a) whether the vessel and its

cargo is thoroughly inspected at the U.S. port of entry prior to entering the harbor, (b) whether the master and crew of the vessel exercise some supervision and inspection of the cargo when loading, (c) the degree of effectiveness of U.S. foreign intelligence services, and (d) on how well they coordinate with U.S. harbor entrance authorities.

(c) Merchant vessel, other than Soviet controlled, loading in a port of a country friendly to the U.S., and entering U.S. port in the normal manner.

Comment: This operation would present extremely difficult and almost impossible problems to the Soviets. After a weapon had left Soviet controlled territory it would be almost impossible to keep it within the exclusive control of Soviet agents. Great probabilities of detection would exist, the degree depending on the conditions listed in the comment under 1(b) above.

(d) Soviet merchant vessel disguised as an American or other nationality and entering in normal manner.

Comment: This operation is considered to involve very great risks of detection prior

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to the vessel being in a position to damage harbor facilities. The present information available to harbor pilots as to the prospective arrival of most vessels and the knowledge and experience of the pilots themselves are strong deterring factors. Early detection of the vessel after it might get into the harbor would be a certainty. The time period between the time of committing a weapon to the vessel and her possible arrival in a U.S. port would be at least ten days.

(e) Soviet merchant vessel entering harbor in thick weather without clearing.
Comment: Under present conditions this appears to be possibly a feasible operation in so far as getting the vessel into the harbor areas. Relatively minor actions on the part of the U.S. will greatly increase the the probability of detection. Early detection of the vessel after entering the harbor would be almost a certainty even under present conditions.

(f) Soviet small craft which had sailed direct from a Soviet controlled port and entered either under disguise as an American vessel or clandestinely.

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Comment: Under present conditions this appears to be a feasible but risky operation. The sighting of an unidentified small craft en-route in Mid-Atlantic for one thing might make the vessel of interest to American authorities long before she reached the American side. When reaching the coast her best possibility would be to make a landfall at a deserted part of the coast, disguise herself as a yacht or American fishing vessel and proceed in the usual coastwise traffic lanes to her port of attack. There would be little trouble at the present time in entering almost unnoticed and getting into the harbor area. Intensification of American harbor entrance surveillance and of boarding operations will vastly increase the risks involved. Minimum attack commitment time probably in excess of 20 days.

(g) Small craft which had loaded from a Soviet submarine or merchant vessel and entered a major port area under disguise as an American vessel or clandestinely.

Comment: This operation is somewhat similar to 1(e) except that much greater risks are involved as there must be local arrangements

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within the U.S., there are possibilities of detection when transferring at sea, an exact prearranged time table is impossible due to the necessity of smooth weather for transfer, transfer may involve damage to bomb, etc.

(h) Submarine entering harbor under cover of darkness or in ~~thick~~ weather.

Comment: This operation is feasible but presents great risks of detection and could probably be done on a suicide basis only.

(i) Small craft loading bomb from a Soviet submarine or merchant vessel, smuggling through an isolated inlet or across the beach, and transporting by land into a port either in an assembled or disassembled state for explosion by time device or remote triggering.

Comment: Under present conditions this appears to be the most feasible undertaking presenting as few chances of detection as any of the other possible courses of action. The greatest chance of detection appears to be the period when the weapon is being transferred to a small craft or raft from a larger vessel or submarine. Landing through a carefully selected isolated inlet or across an isolated beach could be a fairly simple

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operation with little fear of detection by present Coast Guard forces. There is no regular beach patrol. Jeeps and pickups run the length of the beaches. Beach exits are not patrolled. There is no check on trailer truck loads entering vital areas. The operation would have the desirable feature that the weapon could be placed at a suitable point of explosion and set off by either a time bomb or by remote control at a designated time. The operation has the disadvantage of requiring shoreside collusion. The chances of detection depend largely on how well federal and municipal authorities and local citizens coordinate in the detection and prevention of such attempts.

(2) Wide dissemination of imported biologic and similar destructive agents useful against persons, animals, and plant life. Importation carried out by (1)(a) to (1)(i) inclusive.

Comment: The smuggling of biologics can from the Coast Guard standpoint be considered under the same general conditions as the smuggling of atomic weapons. The various considerations concerning the possible use of biologics, the difficulties in preventing their being carried ashore in the

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clothing of merchant seamen etc. are considered to come more under the responsibility of other federal agencies and will not be discussed in this paper.

(3) Wide sabotage against vessels and waterfront facilities.

Comment: The methods by which vessels and waterfront facilities can be sabotaged by communist agents are many and most are fairly well known. The factors which must be considered by the enemy as to the risk and the timing of sabotage activities are discussed elsewhere in this paper. The main feature to be discussed here is that there are many known and unknown communist agents scattered throughout the country and that they have readily available in this country all the materials needed for small or large scale sabotage operations. The materials can run from a match or cigarette lighter to large quantities of explosives, or to homegrown biologics. Detailed instructions from Moscow on methods and procedures for sabotage are unnecessary. Advance notice of the time to start sabotage operations might be desirable from the enemy standpoint but is not essential if the enemy preferred not to risk disclosure of intent. The only directive required from Moscow would and probably is a broad directive

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that when reliable information, such as from an American broadcasting station, is received that the war has started all agents will use their own initiative to immediately execute all acts of sabotage that will hurt the American war effort. The directive might indicate that no advance notice of any kind, even the year for an attack, could be given but that agents must maintain the maximum degree of readiness possible without disclosure of intent to the American authorities or public.

Sporadic attempts at minor sabotage prior to the start of a war require protective measures, but this type of sabotage will have vastly less effect on the U.S. war potential than the all-out sabotage when the war starts. From the U.S. standpoint, therefore, the most vital consideration must be the degree of readiness to put into effect antisabotage measures within minutes of the time of an attack and to maintain a suitable degree of readiness on a year round basis. It is obvious that material numbers of federal forces will not be available for this purpose and that in the training and protective activities of available peacetime forces the greatest emphasis must be placed on development of

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security measures to be instituted at the start of a war.

5. TIME FACTORS

a. An illustration of the approximate Soviet timing problem for coordinating the above offensive actions with an air attack is shown on the following table. This table shows an estimate of the time period between the time the Soviets must commit themselves to each action, and therefore stand the risk of detection, and the time at which the offensive action would be consummated.

<u>Course of Action</u>	<u>Minimum Commitment Time Prior to Attack</u>
(1) Smuggling:	
Soviet vessel (not disguised) - 4 <u>a</u> (1)(a)	10 days
Other merchant vessel (from Soviet port) - 4 <u>a</u> (1)(b)	20 days
Other merchant vessel (from friendly port) - 4 <u>a</u> (1)(c)	15 days
Soviet vessel (disguised) - 4 <u>a</u> (1) (d)	10 days
Soviet vessel (clandestine) - 4 <u>a</u> (1)(e)	15 days
Small craft (direct) - 4 <u>a</u> (1)(f)	20 days
Small craft into harbor (from sub) 4 <u>a</u> (1)(g)	15 days
Soviet submarine - 4 <u>a</u> (1)(h)	15 days
Small craft into isolated areas (from sub) - 4 <u>a</u> (1)(i)	15 days
(2) Sabotage	1 day

6. DEFENSE FORCES

a. Coast Guard forces for Port Security and Beach Patrol purposes are known to the Soviets to be about as follows:

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(1) About 4,800 officers and men for various types of port security guard and patrol purposes and operating as part of the regular Coast Guard in ten major port areas.

(2) About 2,500 officers and men assigned to coastal lifeboat and light stations for Search and Rescue and Aids to Navigation purposes. This force is the maximum number on active duty who could be considered as having concurrent duty of beach patrol.

(3) Thirty-five organized Reserve training units, of about 90 officers and men each, being trained in port security duty in most port areas. According to reports of Coast Guard appropriations for fiscal 1952 the number of organized Coast Guard reservists for port security duty may reach a total of 3,700 within the next year.

b. The number of personnel on active duty plus the number of trained reservists for port security and beach patrol will, as noted above, total only about 11,000 for fiscal 1952. The number estimated as required for adequate security for these purposes in war time is estimated at 71,000.

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7. PRESENT AND RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE MEASURES

a. Present Defensive Measures

Each Coast Guard District Commander is operating under a directive which requires him to carry out the following tasks within his respective district:

(1) Announce publicly and in separate written communications to appropriate authorities, agencies, and commercial enterprises concerned that the present situation requires adequate protection for waterfront facilities to prevent damage and losses from accidents and sabotage. Emphasize the fact that the responsibility placed upon the Coast Guard under the Magnuson Act does not abrogate the basic responsibility of local authorities, owners, and operators for the security of waterfront facilities. Further, advise that Coast Guard forces are available for shoreside protection only in special cases.

(2) Consult with, and direct the Captain of the Port to consult with, interested parties in each port, such as, (a) Local representatives of Federal, State and Municipal agencies, (b) Owners, operators or their representatives, and (c) Representatives of maritime labor and related organizations, for the purpose of formulating

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policies and rules for the protection of the ports, vessels, and waterfront facilities. To assist in carrying out this order a committee composed of appropriate representatives of the above listed parties may be established, if deemed advisable, as a Port Advisory Council.

(3) Direct each Captain of the Port, in consultation with these representatives or the Port Advisory Council, to initiate a program for the survey of waterfront facilities in his port area to determine measures and standards considered necessary to obtain a reasonable degree of security for each facility against sabotage and accident under present conditions. Consideration must be given at all times to the necessity for a proper balance between the cost of federal, civil and private protective measures and the standard of protection actually required. Arbitrary and excessive protective requirements will contribute to the over-all objective of a potential enemy by creating dissension and by placing unnecessary economic strain on local communities and private enterprise.

(4) Direct each Captain of the Port, in consultation with these representatives or the Port Advisory Council, to draft recommended

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regulations setting forth conditions and restrictions relating to the safety of waterfront facilities and vessels in port. Submit them to Headquarters for consideration. The recommended regulations should be adequate for protection, yet no more restrictive than necessary to provide for reasonable security.

(5) Review State and municipal laws and other local ordinances relating to the safety of waterfront facilities in each port area to determine the safety measures that can be enforced by other than Federal authority. Advise Headquarters of the general effectiveness of local enforcement.

(6) Encourage and assist local authorities, and owners and operators of waterfront facilities to take necessary steps to protect all waterfront facilities.

(7) Train port security personnel in the basic details pertaining to the protection of port facilities against damage or loss resulting from accident, fire, or sabotage.

(8) Continue program for the issuance of port security cards in the ports where a program for the screening of longshoremen is currently

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authorized. Encourage property owners, operators, and labor organizations to require possession of Coast Guard port security cards for entrance to waterfront property. Specify that this will eventually be a required standard for all property which is being used for shipments important to the national defense.

(9) As soon as an adequate number of long-shoremen are in possession of Port Security Cards, and in cooperation with appropriate labor union officials and operators, place into effect measures for preventing personnel not holding credentials approved by the Commandant from entering areas where the following shipping activities are conducted:

(a) Those vital to the Military Defense Assistance Program.

(b) Those pertaining to the support of U.S. military operations.

(c) Those pertaining to loading and unloading explosives and other dangerous cargo.

The urgency of early measures in this connection is to provide the incentive for more longshoremen to apply for clearance.

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(10) Continue the program for the screening of merchant marine personnel.

(11) Continue the program for the supervision of explosives and dangerous cargo loading.

(12) Provide waterside patrol of anchorage areas, waterfront facilities, vital bridges and underwater tunnels within all major ports.

(13) Alert all coastal light and lifeboat stations of the threat of attempts to smuggle unconventional weapons into the U. S. across the isolated coastal beaches and waterway inlets and require appropriate countermeasures to prevent such acts. Have these stations solicit civilian intelligence and provide channel for reporting suspicious operations in stretches of coastal beaches remote from Coast Guard stations.

(14) Coordinate and adjust operational schedules of appropriate floating units, and utilize lifeboat stations and other shore units where practicable, to establish a vigorous program for active surveillance and boarding of fishing vessels, yachts and other small craft, particularly near harbor and inlet entrances.

(15) Establish, and maintain as continuous a patrol as possible of one vessel at the entrance

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to each of the major harbors listed below. As far as practicable maintain the patrol with vessels of the WPB (83' patrol boat) type and larger:

New York
Hampton Roads
New Orleans
San Francisco Bay
Boston
Philadelphia and Delaware River ports
Seattle and Puget Sound ports
Los Angeles
Galveston Bay ports
Portland Oregon and Columbia River ports

(16) Obtain operational agreement and coordination with appropriate harbor pilots so that they will act in conjunction with the Coast Guard to screen entering vessels for the purpose of passing legitimate traffic without interference and of deterring vessels considered suspicious from entering the harbor until they have been given thorough search and examination by Coast Guard and Customs authorities.

(17) Take measures, in cooperation with local harbor pilots and with appropriate Collector of Customs, to insure that all U.S.S.R. and satellite merchant vessels arriving in District ports are halted and given thorough customs search as soon as possible before entering harbor areas and before attaining any proximity to naval or military installations, port installations,

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bridges, docks or other vessels, and that they are kept under surveillance thereafter until departure. A Coast Guard boarding officer shall board each such vessel at the point at which it is halted and shall remain on board until the Customs officers have completed their search. If the vessel is found to be carrying radiological, biological, chemical or other weapons or if the Coast Guard boarding officer has evidence of serious irregularities, he shall assume control of the vessel and report all pertinent details by urgent priority dispatch to his operational senior, who shall forward same immediately to the District Commander and Headquarters. Even though no evidence of unfriendly intent is uncovered during the boarding and search, surveillance over each such vessel shall continue to be maintained. In the above paragraph "U.S.S.R. and satellite merchant vessels" shall include every merchant vessel known or, on reasonable grounds and regardless of registry, suspected, of being owned, controlled, or in the service of U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, Eastern Germany or Eastern Austria.

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(18) Effectively utilize Coast Guard radar stations for harbor entrance coverage. Coordinate Coast Guard harbor entrance radar station operation with harbor entrance patrol.

(19) Review current and planned deployment of forces available to the District in order to most effectively carry out his mission. Recommend to Headquarters changes desired and any action desired of Headquarters to facilitate such changes.

(20) Evaluate the desirability of the establishment and control of restricted anchorage areas and submit appropriate recommendations to Headquarters.

(21) Insure the maintenance of appropriate plans, deployment of forces and local arrangements for the maximum practicable over-all protection, within current force availabilities, of vessels and port facilities in case of sudden enemy attack.

b. Proposed Additional Defensive Measures

The following measures are considered feasible and will provide additional security:

(1) Increase the scope of control of foreign and domestic merchant vessels entering United States ports by the following steps:

Dr. Millikan believes that the proposals in Paras.

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7 & (1) (a), (b), (c) have not been explored far enough

to justify their approval by the NSC as a feasible

scheme of ship reporting. Discussions are proceeding on

the most effective scheme to establish, but no plan

has yet been developed.

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(a) Obtain assistance from the State Department and encourage the master of each vessel trading between a foreign and a U.S. port to obtain an appropriate "Certificate to expedite entry into American ports" from consular agent at last foreign port of departure. Encourage the masters of U.S. and friendly foreign merchant vessels to consider themselves as part of the Security team.

(b) Obtain, through consular agents and State Department in Washington, advance notice of the arrival of vessels which have been issued above-mentioned certificate.

(c) Obtain, from CIA sources any unfavorable information on specific vessels prior to their arrival off U.S. ports.

(d) Require by regulation that vessels desiring to enter U.S. ports enter through defined areas in order to obtain better control over entering vessels.

(e) Require by regulation that entering vessels identify themselves to the pilot vessel and/or the Coast Guard patrol vessel.

(f) Establish arrangements with the masters of U.S. merchant vessels, fishing

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vessels, and small craft for the reporting of suspicious ship movements.

(g) Through instructions issued by State Department and enforced through the harbor entrance patrol and harbor pilots prevent Soviet controlled vessels from entering major port areas.

(h) Permit Soviet controlled vessels to enter only ports classified as intermediate and minor but provide for thorough customs search of all such vessels.

(2) Establish, control, and patrol restricted anchorage areas in each major harbor. Moderate patrol activity by Coast Guard craft and active coordination with FBI to deter sabotage and smuggling should give a relatively high degree of effectiveness.

(3) Increase the scope of the waterside patrol of port areas after obtaining the necessary additional patrol craft.

(4) Obtain additional WPB type (83'-90') patrol craft to permit continuous patrols by this type vessel at the entrances to major port areas.

(5) Increase the scope of the program of issuing port security cards to longshoremen.

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Cards are issued through the procedure of accepting applications which are processed by the FBI. Personnel having record of subversive activity are denied cards. Present restrictions to the FBI from the Bureau of the Budget limit the numbers to be screened to 100,000. It is essential to have a large number of card holders in order to be able to restrict important loading areas to card holders only without delaying ship loading. Limiting the number to be screened to 100,000 is not an acceptable risk. There should be a present goal of at least 500,000. This would require no increase in Coast Guard forces now assigned to the screening program, but would require an increase in the FBI appropriation by about \$2,000,000.

(6) Take positive steps to make greater use of psychological factors of self-interest, self-appreciation, and self-respect on the part of personnel such as longshoremen to encourage and obtain their assistance as part of the Security team. For example, longshoremen in their day to day work are in a position to observe and take corrective measures to protect shipments and port facilities from damage from accidental

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causes and from sabotage. A little flattery as to their importance on the team and relatively minor assistance by the Coast Guard and the FBI in a self-educational program of safety and antisabotage measures could pay tremendous dividends.

(7) Extend the scope of the program for supervising the loading of explosives. This must be carried out by trained Coast Guard personnel physically inspecting the loading of all vessels carrying explosives. Fireboat protection for loading operations is considered essential. At the present time personnel are being trained for this task for ten port areas. This should be increased to fifteen ports. No fireboats have been authorized for this operation. This is not an acceptable risk. A minimum of 15 Coast Guard fireboats is considered essential.

(8) Increase the scope of the present program for preventing the illegal entry from sea at other than major port areas. As it is impracticable to provide sufficient forces to actively patrol all small ports, isolated inlets and beaches, reliance must be placed primarily on the following measures:

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(a) Insuring alertness of Coast Guard personnel at lifeboat stations and light stations and carrying out active boarding campaign as directed in 6 a (13) and (14) above.

(b) Arranging with FBI for coordinated intelligence over entire coastal area and providing appropriate geographical allocation of Coast Guard forces to take action on intelligence received.

(9) Make preparations for extensive interim wartime waterside port protection for port areas. Plan on the acquisition on an immediate emergent loan basis of appropriate yachts and small craft owned by members of the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and on the manning of these boats with regular members of the U. S. Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve for the purpose of providing wartime waterside port protection in the event of an emergency. This use of privately owned boats can be terminated when additional Coast Guard small craft are acquired after mobilization.

(10) Prevent subversives from sailing as crew members on American vessels. Up to the present date this has been accomplished aboard

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ship by checking each individual crew member prior to time of "sign on" against a master list of seamen who have been classified as security risks. This procedure is now used for vessels of the following categories:

(a) All merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and upward engaged in the foreign trade,

(b) All merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and upward engaged in trade to the Dominion of Canada, the West Indies, or Mexico,

(c) All merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and upward engaged in the intercoastal trade,

(d) All merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and upward engaged in the coastwise trade, including those vessels engaged in trade to Alaska or the Hawaiian Islands, and

(e) All merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and upward engaged in trade on the Great Lakes.

Meanwhile, a large program for screening seamen by the FBI and issuing specially validated

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documents to non-subversives has been in progress. As of 11 May, 1951, a sufficient number of seamen to operate the American Merchant Marine (136,000) has been checked and cleared for security and authorizations for the issuance of validated documents to these men are in the appropriate Coast Guard issuing offices. So far 52,000 validated documents have been issued; the present rate of issuance is 3000 per week but this rate should increase. After 1 August, 1951, on the Great Lakes, the validated documents will be required as a requisite to employment of seamen. The same requirement will be made progressively for other categories of shipping in order that shipping will not be delayed due to insufficient seamen with validated documents. Probably by 1 October, 1951, this requirement will apply to all categories.

(11) Obtain an additional Executive Order to permit the Coast Guard to prevent a vessel from mooring to a pier which is not adequately protected. This is considered necessary in order to provide coercive measures for enforcing safety requirements when necessary.

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Comment: It is believed that the present and the additional security measures recommended may, with only small increases in Coast Guard floating equipment, provide a reasonable degree of Port Security under present conditions and with acceptable calculated risks. A reevaluation of force requirements is considered necessary, however, after there has been further opportunity to analyze the effectiveness of the present and proposed program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that the defensive measures listed in paragraph ⁵~~7~~ be carried out and that, pending further study and development of personnel requirements, the only appropriation increase deemed essential for Port Security at this time is for the additional construction program indicated below:

VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT

<u>Activity</u>		Presently Authorized (2nd Suppl. '51) <u>Number</u>	Additional Recommended <u>Number</u>	Total <u>Number</u>
	Vessels			
Control of Entry	83'-90'	10	20	30
Harbor Patrol	40'	120	30	150
Explosive Loading	65'	0	15	15
Helicopters		3	0	3
Acquisition cost		\$7,900,000	\$10,615,000	\$18,515,000

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9. It is further recommended that steps be taken to secure an increase of the Federal Bureau of Investigation appropriation for fiscal 1952 of two million dollars in order that this agency will be able to increase the scope of its function in the current personnel screening program.

Comment: While it is believed that a considerable degree of Port Security can be obtained on a very austere basis by carrying out the operations indicated in paragraph 7b, attention of appropriate authorities should be invited to the following situation: Port Security and Beach Patrol are only two of the wartime tasks of the Coast Guard. The Department of Defense expects the Coast Guard to be reasonably prepared to carry out wartime missions. However, as of the date of this report, the only expansion authorized for the Coast Guard is the 4,700 man increase for a limited port security program. Failure to grant reasonable increases of personnel for certain Coast Guard operating units for overall military readiness will have a definite bearing on the problem of port security and beach patrol as even the small forces provided for those purposes would have to be diluted at the beginning of an emergency, to permit the carrying out of other assigned emergency tasks.

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